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BAR BRIEFS

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
State ex rel Fried v. McDonald. Habeas Corpus. The relator is
the parent of four children of school age and defendant is a sheriff.
The relator lives more than two and one-quarter miles from the nearest
school. The school board did not offer vehicular transportation to or
actual carriage of the children of relator to school, but did offer to pay
him fifty cents per day for transporting his children to school. The relator did not, under the circumstances, require his children to attend, and
was prosecuted for violating the compulsory school attendance law and
a fine was imposed. HELD: That under Section 1342, Compiled Laws
1913, as amended by Chapter 206, Session Laws of 1917, it is the legislative intent to make the parents of children of Ischool age living beyond
the two and one-quarter mile limit amenable to the criminal provisions
of the statute in cases where the school board actually furnishes or offers to furnish vehicular transportation or actual carriage to the children. The relator therefore is not guilty of violating the penal provisions of the statute and is ordered released. Nuessle J., dissenting.
(Opinion filed, February 26, 1926).
State doing business as Bank of North Dakota v. Stolting et al.
The head of a family who held title to premises occupied by himself and
his family for some twelve years as a homestead executed a warranty
deed to his wife in which the wife joined. On the same day the wife
executed a note to a bank, of which the husband was a director, and
president, and secured it with a mortgage on the homestead, the husband not joining therein. The husband procured the wife's signature
to the note and mortgage, delivered them to the bank, and himself received credit for the face of the note. The mortgage was recorded about
a year and a half later, and was of record when a note and mortgage on
the property were executed 'by the wife and her husband to the defendant
bank. The first note and mortgage were assigned to the plaintiff, which
brought an action to foreclose. The defense is that since the mortgage
held by the plaintiff was a mortgage on the homestead in which the
husband did not join, it was invalid. HELD: That the mortgagor and
the second mortgagee were estopped as against the assignee of the first
mortgage to assert the invalidity of the mortgage on the homestead.
(Opinion filed March 3rd, 1926).
Hughes Electric Company v. Burleigh County. An electric utility
owned by plaintiff was assessed by the local authorities, and though
two other like utilities were located in the county, the board of county
commissioners, sitting as a board of equalization, increased the value of
the property of the plaintiff in a resolution specifically designating the
property. An application was made to the board asserting the invalidity of the transaction and asking that the valuation fixed by the local
board be recognized as valid. Plaintiff tendered the amount due under
the last valuation. The application was denied and an appeal taken to
the district court. HELD: The board of county commissioners, sitting
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as a board of equalization, has no power to raise or change an individual
assessment; that changes can be effected only by equalizing property of
the same class; and that illegal action by the commissioners in this behalf may be corrected by them under Section 2165, Compiled Laws of
1913, as amended by Chapter 227, Laws of 1917. (Opinion filed March
2nd, 1926).
Morton County v. Hughes Electric Company. The defendant, a
public electric utility, undertook to construct a transmission line between
Bismarck and Mandan. The highway commission granted permission
to attach the line to the Missouri river bridge, and to use the approaches
thereto. Plaintiff brought the action to enjoin the defendant from using the bridge for this purpose, contending that it has control over the
west half of the bridge. HELD: A board of county commissioners has
no power to control or supervise or grant a right of way to a public
service corporation over or upon any state highway within the limits of
their county, that all state highways are under the general control and
supervision of the state highway commission, but that such commission
has no power to grant a right of way for the erection of an electric power
transmission line over or upon any of the highways under its control
and supervision. Sections 1921 and 5444, Compiled Laws of 1913, Chapter 188, Laws of 1925, and Section 2, Chapter 141, Laws of 1919, construed. (Opinion filed March 4th, 1926).
Minot Special School Dist:ict v. Olsness: In a proceeding to prohibit and enjoin the commissioner of insurance from enforcing the state
fire and tornado insurance fund law against the plaintiff, IT IS HELD:
That the law establishing the state fire and tornado fund for the purpose of furnishing fire and tornado insurance upon the property of the
state, counties, cities, and other political sub-divisions thereof, is not unconstitutional on the ground that it abrogates or impairs the right of
freedom of contract; that it does not violate any express or implied guaranty of the right of local self-government; that the wisdom, necessity
or expediency of legislation are matters for legislative and not judicial
determination; that the act in question does not create an indebtedness
on the part of the state of North Dakota at all; and that the act is not
unconstitutional as delegating taxing power to the commissioner of insurance. (Opinion filed February 17, 1926).
Talcott v. Bailey: Each of the two life insurance policies involved
in this action recognizes the right of assignment, but stipulates that
it should become binding only when it or a copy thereof is filed in the
home office, and each permits a change of beneficiary. At the time of
the death of the insured each policy was payable to the executor, administrator or assigns of the assured. The deceased left a will providing
that no part of his property was left to the plaintiff. Plaintiff and
defendant are the sole heirs at law, and plaintiff claims one-half the
proceeds of the insurance policies. HELD: The county court is without
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jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of title to the proceeds of an insurance policy payable to the heirs or the estate of the insured because
whoever may be designated in the policy by the insured to receive the
proceeds after his death takes by contract and not by descent, and such
proceeds do not become a part of the decedent's estate. Section 8719,
Compiled Laws 1913, does not attempt to confer jurisdiction on the
county court in violation of Section 111 of the State Constitution, and
the duty to inventory and distribute such a policy rests upon the executor or administrator, and not on the court. Section 8719 is not an exemption statute within Section 208 of the State Constitution. The right
to transfer a policy of insurance by will or assignment remains under
Section 6629, Compiled Laws 1913, and the proceeds of these policies
are not property of the testator in the sense that they pass as a part of
his estate, but go to the beneficiaries by contract and not by descent.
(Opinion filed February 17, 1926).
U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Consignors of goods f. o. b. destination, although the freight is actually paid by the consignee and there is a provision that the buyer shall
be liable for and get the benefit of any rise or fall in the freight rate,
may nevertheless maintain an action against the carrier to recover overcharges for transportation.-Louisville & Nashville Co. vs. Sloss-Sheffield Co., Sup. Ct. Rep. 46-73.
A shipper is
carrier's liability
the fact that the
true value of the
iel, Sup. Ct. Rep.

bound by the terms of a freight receipt limiting the
for loss on goods for which a lower rate is paid, and
carrier knew that shipper's agent was ignorant of the
goods is immaterial.-Amer. Ry. Express Co. vs. Dan46-14.

The 1921 Oklahoma statute establishing an eight hour day and providing that all workmen employed by or on behalf of the State be paid
"not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where
.the work is performed" is void for failure to fix any ascertainable standard of guilt.-Connally vs. General Construction Co., Sup. Ct. Rep.
46-126.
Section 3 of the Future Trading Act of 1921, imposing a tax of 20c
per bushel upon every privilege or option for a contract whether of purchase or of sale of grain, was not intended to produce revenue but to
prohibit all such contracts and hence can not be sustained as a valid
exercise of the taxing power.-Trusler vs. Crooks, Sup. Ct. Rep. 46-165.
Consulting engineers professionally employed to advise states or
sub-divisions of states are not officers and employees, and income received as compensation, whether in daily, monthly, annual, or lump sums,
is not exempt from Federal income tax.-Metcalf vs. Mitchell, Sup. Ct.
Rep. 46-172.

